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The Joint Law Venture:
A Pilot Study
By
Jayanth K. Krishnan
Abstract
This pilot study evaluates the effectiveness of law firms entering into joint ventures, an
increasingly eyed business model particularly by American and British lawyers seeking to
expand into promising financial markets. One country at the center of the joint venture
experiment has been Singapore. With the strong encouragement of the Singaporean
government (which has long embraced foreign investment), various elite law firms from the
United States and Britain have been partnering with domestic Singaporean law firms for over
the past decade. Because these foreign firms were traditionally barred from practicing
Singaporean law on their own, the ‘joint law venture,’ or JLV as it came to be called, was
initiated to provide the Americans and British with an opportunity to access the highlydesired, lucrative local market – through the use of their Singaporean joint venture
colleagues. In return, the Singaporean firms were to benefit by gaining international legal
contacts, learning ‘best practices’ from their foreign counterparts, and enhancing their
reputations by being tied to prestigious law firm powerhouses.
Until now, no work has fully investigated whether these JLVs have actually fared as well as
their advocates had hoped. Therefore, based on fieldwork conducted in Singapore, including
in-depth interviews of the relevant parties, this project fills this gap – uncovering how due to
economic misalignment, cultural misunderstandings, and a sheer breakdown of necessary
human relationships, in more cases than not the JLV has been a failed business model. For
these reasons, I argue that American and British law firms may wish to think seriously before
pursuing the JLV route – not just in Singapore but perhaps even in other markets in which
they are already present or are contemplating entering.



Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer
School of Law. (Email: jkrishna@indiana.edu). This study falls under the aegis of the Maurer School’s
Center on the Global Legal Profession. I wish to thank Umakanth Varottil, whose close reading, trenchant
comments, and generous assistance with all of his contacts throughout Singapore made this study possible.
Also for their insights, I am appreciative to Marc Galanter, Jonathan Gingerich, Bill Henderson, Zia Mody,
Michelle Olson, Laurel Terry, and David Wilkins. And finally, to the numerous lawyers and other
professionals who gave me a detailed tour of how the law firms-universe works in Singapore, although I
cannot thank you by name (due to my promise of anonymity to each of you), I am in your unqualified debt
for the time and education you gave to me.
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Introduction
The current economic downturn has forced large law firms in the United
States to scale back their hiring practices, lay-off employees, and reconsider their
overall business structure.1 One prominent scholar has argued “that the bubble
has permanently burst on the traditional BigLaw [or big law firm] model.”2 As
such, the ramification of the economic crisis is that regional and local law firms
will play a more prominent role in the delivery of legal services.3 The thought is
that because they incur lower costs (in terms of salaries and fees) and are
generally more attentive to client-needs, these smaller firms are likely to receive
greater amounts of work that otherwise would have headed to the elite law firms.4
1
For a detailed listing of firms that have been suffering under the present economic crisis, the legal
professions blog, Law Shucks (together with David Lat’s blog, Above the Law, see e.g.,
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/06/13/) has been maintaining copious data on the number of lay-offs occurring
at law firms in Britain and the United States. See http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/,
2
See commentary by Professor William Henderson on the widely read legal blog, Brian Leiter Law
Reports, April 30, 2009, at http://leiterlawschool.typepad.com/leiter/2009/04/the-upheaval-in-the-market-fornew-lawyers-at-the-big-law-firms-temporary-or-permanent.html. Also see, John P. Heinz, When Law Firms
Fail, 43 SUFFOLK L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2009). And see Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law,
University of Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper LE 09-025 (2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1467730.
3
See Henderson, supra note 2.
4
Id.

2
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This pilot study will seek to add a more international dimension to the
analysis. As big law firms in the United States have struggled, so too have their
counterparts in Britain. The result is that many large law firms in both countries
are focusing on markets that until now have been untapped. The mega-firm of
DLA Piper, for example, in October of 2008 opened an office in Kuwait, noting
that the country’s strong economic presence within the Gulf Cooperation Council
served as the impetus for this move.5 Similarly, a partner from a high-powered
British firm recently commented that places like “Jakarta and Vietnam are the hot
markets now where [Western] lawyers can mint money.”6 And a report by the
Bloomberg news group notes that the slumping global economy “has encouraged .
. . firms led by Cleary Gottlieb, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and
Dewey & LeBoeuf to accelerate foreign expansion programs . . . . .”7
That American and British law firms are ‘going international’ is not a new
development. But because these law firms have not experienced such hard-hitting
economic conditions in more than a generation, the manner in which they are
looking to create business in other countries merits scholarly attention. One
method being used to enter newer markets is the establishment of what is called
the JLV, or joint law venture. The structure of this entity is straightforward. An
American firm, for instance, decides it wants to expand, say, into country X.
While X allows foreign lawyers to conduct international transactions within its
borders, it has stringent licensing requirements that effectively bar the American
(and all other foreign) lawyers from practicing X’s domestic laws. Yet the
American firm has been eyeing country X precisely because it believes there is
potential for earning a great amount of money from the local business sector. As
a result, the American firm contacts, develops a relationship with, and eventually
enters into a joint law venture with a local firm from X. The JLV is a legally
distinct body that now has as one of its main advantages the ability to practice,
through it locally-licensed lawyers, the laws of country X.8
5

See Joint Venture Agreement Announced between Leading Kuwaiti Law Firm and DLA Piper,
October 8, 2008, http://www.dlapiper.com/global/media/detail.aspx?news=2821.
6
Author interview with elite law firm partner, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested of both name and
firm).
7
See Lindsay Fortado, Law Firms Find Work Abroad as U.S. Mergers Hit a Low,
BLOOMBERG.COM, April 10, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=aAwmFwVMjgaM&refer=home. For a later
article that appeared in November of 2008 affirming this position, when the U.S. economy was arguably at
one of its lowest points, see, John Bringardner, U.S. Law Firms Expanding Abroad, NEW YORK TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/world/americas/23iht-lawyers.1.18063294.html.
8
For enlightening work on this subject of joint law ventures in Japan, see Bruce E. Aronson, The
Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan, 21 COLUMBIA J. ASIAN LAW 45 (2007); Bruce E. Aronson, Elite
Law Firm Mergers and Reputational Competition: Is Bigger Really Better? An International Comparison, 40
VAND. J. TRANS. LAW 763 (2007). David Wilkins, who is cited extensively later in this study (infra notes
25 and 31), has also discussed joint ventures, but in a different vein (noting the emerging relationships
between lawyers and their clients.) See e.g., David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the
Corporate Attorney/Client Relationship, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2009); David B.
Wilkins, Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1998). For
other studies of relevance, see, David A. Gantz, Doi Moi, the VBTA, and WTO Accession, The Role of
Lawyers in Vietnam’s No Longer Cautious Embrace of Globalization, 41 INT’L. LAWYER 873 (2007); Jeff
Coburn, All for One: Strategic Alliances Are Good for Business, Clients, 17 (5) LEGAL MGMT. 46 (1998);

3

Berkeley Journal of International Law (2010)
Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Joint Law Venture

Indiana University‐Bloomington
Maurer School of Law

In theory then, the JLV appears like an optimal route for the American law
firm to pursue. Theoretically, there are also benefits for the local firm in country
X. It has an opportunity to gain international contacts, learn skills and ‘best
practices’ from the American counterparts, and link itself to a high-prestige U.S.
firm. Therefore, it seems as though the JLV is a win-win strategy for both sides.
But is it really? Below, I preliminarily test this theory by looking at a
country that has been considered a major hub for JLVs for over the past decade.
The wealthy Asian country of Singapore, with a population of 4.8 million, is a
significant financial center, where business elites from states like Japan, China,
Indonesia, and Malaysia interact with one another as well as with economic
players from India, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. Since becoming
fully independent in 1965, Singapore has made economic development a primary
goal, successfully achieving gross domestic product and per capita income
numbers that are among the highest in the world.9 As part of its development
plan, Singapore has aggressively liberalized its economy, including its legal
services sector. For decades foreign law firms have been granted admission into
the country, but they have been prohibited from practicing Singaporean law.10
Then about ten years ago the government sought to expand the scope under which
foreign law firms could work. Upon consultation with lawyers from the United
States and Britain, as well as its own domestic bar, the Singaporean government
began allowing for the establishment of the JLV in the late 1990s, believing it
would positively serve all parties involved. And indeed between 2000 and 2009
eleven JLVs were created between elite foreign law firms on the one side and
local Singaporean firms on the other.
Jonathan Barsade, The Effect of EC Regulations Upon the Ability of U.S. Lawyers to Establish a PanEuropean Practice, 28 INT’L. LAW 313 (1994); Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualification and
Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Gap, 63 TUL. L. REV. 443
(1989). While she does not focus on the subject of joint law ventures (notwithstanding a mention in footnote
#30), Carole Silver, in a 2007 study, discusses how globalization has led American law firms to emphasize
the importance of recognizing what she terms “[t]he rise of local players.” For a discussion on this reliance,
see Carole Silver, Local Matters: Internationalizing Strategies for U.S. Law Firms, 14 INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 67, 77-89. (Also for a discussion on joint relationships in terms of law firms
and legal outsourcing companies, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Outsourcing and the Globalizing Legal
Profession, 48 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW 2189 (2007); and Mary C. Daly and Carole Silver,
Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical and Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and LawRelated Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 401 (2007); Mimi Samuel and Laura Currie Oates, From Oppression
to Outsourcing: New Opportunities for Uganda’s Growing Number of Attorneys in Today’s Flattening
World, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUSTICE 835 (2006); Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World is Flat:
Globalization and Its Effects on Lawyers Practicing in Non-Global Law Firms, 28 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
527 (2008). And there has been work on joint ventures between law firms and non-legal entities, see e.g.,
John S. Dzienkowski and Robert J. Peroni, Multi-Disciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession:
A Market Approach to the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
83 (2000); Gregory Steven Swan, The Political Economy of Interprofessional Imperialism: The Bar and
Multidisciplinary Practice, 1999-2001, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 151 (2000).
9
For data that bears this point out, see World Economic Outlook Database-April 2009, International
Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.
10
Author interview with lawyer from a well-known Singaporean firm, June 9, 2009 (anonymity
requested.) For brief background on this point, see Warren B. Chik, Brief Notes: Recent International
Developments in Singapore, 7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 267 (2003).
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Yet to-date no sustained work has evaluated how effective these JLVs
have functioned in Singapore. Therefore, during part of the summer of 2009 I
spent time in the country conducting fieldwork on this subject. As I quickly
learned upon my arrival, more than half of these eleven JLVs have since been
disbanded. In fact, as I also learned, in 2007 the government formally adopted a
new set of procedures (that came into force earlier this year, 2009) intended to
facilitate the liberalization of the legal services sector.11 With these facts as my
starting points, I set out to understand why many of the JLVs had not lived-up to
their theoretical accolades – and of those that remain standing, why they have
managed to do so. Employing the well-accepted empirical method of semistructured interviews, I met with nine high-ranking lawyers representing six of the
eleven JLVs. Subsequently, upon my return to the States I carried-out phone
interviews with three other lawyers respectively representing three additional,
separate JLVs. (There were also follow-up email exchanges with several of these
respondents, and I conducted interviews with lawyers in Singaporean, U.S., and
U.K. firms that have affirmatively decided not to opt for the joint entity.12) The
data gathered reveal a telling account, detailed below, illustrating some pluses –
but also many pitfalls – that have accompanied the JLV. And it is for these
reasons why I will argue that in the future American and British law firms should
think seriously before pursuing the JLV route – not just in Singapore but even
perhaps more broadly in other markets in which they are already present or are
contemplating entering.
Before moving to my findings, though, this project will proceed in the
following manner. Section One will review those studies that have discussed the
structure of law firms over the years. In addition, I draw on those works by
business and economics scholars that have explored international joint ventures,
in particular, and explain how these studies can apply to my research and help fill
an important gap in the legal professions’ scholarship. Section Two briefly
covers Singapore’s meteoric economic rise and the political environment in which
this growth has occurred. From there, I describe the nature of the Singaporean
legal profession and how the American and British presence and the JLV fit
within this landscape. Section Three then presents the findings of my fieldwork
and interviews, which cast doubt on the theory that JLVs are necessarily an ideal
vehicle for Western law firms to expand into newer markets. Finally, Section
Four assesses where to go from here and by offering the beginnings of alternative
models of what globalizing law firms interested in migrating into untapped

11

We will be focusing on these government measures in detail towards the end of the study. For
background on what occurred, the Singaporean government’s Ministry of Law website has the relevant
information at http://www.mlaw.gov.sg/qflp/.
12
The nature of my interviews with these all of individuals at times touched on professionally
delicate matters. Based on my consultation with my university’s human subjects institutional review board,
which granted me full approval to conduct my research, I promised all of my respondents that their identities
would be kept confidential. For that reason, throughout the course of this study, I redact the names of my
interviewees in my citations and the firms for which they work.
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markets might do in the future, given the challenges now known to confront the
joint law venture.

I.

Surveying the Literature and Identifying the Gaps

Notwithstanding Erwin Smigel’s riveting book on Wall Street lawyers
from over four decades ago or Paul Hoffmann’s 1973 work, Lions in the Street,
little was written or known about the structure and business model of American
law firms until after 1979.13 It was in that year when the attorney, writer, and
publisher, Steven Brill, launched The American Lawyer, a monthly magazine that
has since developed into a leading publication that tracks various aspects of the
legal profession, including how law firms function.14 Within its “Firms” section,
the magazine discusses work being done, management issues, employment, and
the overall legal environment in which lawyers are currently operating.15 There is
also its most well-known feature, which consists of ranking the top law firms in
the United States on the basis of gross profits, profitability per partner, and
salaries of full-time and summer associates.16
The American Lawyer has spawned other similar types of publications.
(The American Bar Association, for instance, has a weekly e-mailing that, among
other items, contains data, news, and human interest stories on what is happening
in the law firm world.17) And there are numerous blogs that cover this sector of
the legal profession with great interest.18
With more information available on law firm practices, academic studies
soon emerged as well. For example, during the late 1980s, Robert Nelson
published Partners with Power, which revealed a transition by particularly
corporate law firms towards more specialized, non-litigation oriented practices.19
A few years later, Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay wrote Tournament of
Lawyers, arguing that the structure of large law firms could be explained by the
13

See ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATIONAL MAN? (1964); PAUL HOFFMANN, LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE GREAT WALL STREET LAWYERS (1973). For a discussion of this point, and an
ensuing account of the development of the scholarly literature, see Eli Wald, The Other Legal Profession and
the Orthodox View of the Bar: The Rise of Colorado’s Elite Law Firms, 80 U. COL. L. REV. 605 (2009).
14
For background and content of this magazine, see AMERICAN LAWYER.COM,
http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/index.jsp. Also, see Wald, supra note 13 at footnote 419.
15
See id at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/work/index.html.
16
Id.
17
See e.g., ABA JOURNAL WEEKLY NEWSLETTER, http://abajournal.com/weekly/.
18
See e.g., Above the Law, www.abovethelaw.com, Law Shucks, http://lawshucks.com/layofftracker/, The Legal Profession Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/, Empirical Legal
Studies Blog, www.elsblog.org.
19
See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988). For a concise summary of the works that came out post-1980, see
JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, EDWARD O. LAUMANN, AND REBECCA L. SANDEFUR,
URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 12-13 (2005); and see Wald, supra
note 13 at 612-20.
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race to partnership – that then in turn would lead to a need to hire more associates,
which then would lead to even larger firms.20 In 2008, Galanter, this time
together with William Henderson, followed-up on that study by noting that
although the race-to-the-partnership thesis was still both relevant and applicable,
there were concerning ramifications of this tournament that the original model
had not initially foreseen.21 Namely, the obsession with growth and economic
profitability led firms to shun other worthwhile causes, such as thinking about the
need for racial and gender diversity, taking-up pro bono cases, and mentoring
younger lawyers.22 According to Galanter and Henderson, the existing structure
of big law firms effectively only allowed for a culture that valued ‘the bottom
dollar’ – and little else.
In-between Tournament of Lawyers and that 2008 article, other studies
examined this point and, more broadly, the subject of how firm structure and
culture intersected as well.23 For example, a number of authors found that
gender-equity, in terms of salaries or promoting women to partners, was simply
not part of law firm culture.24 And similarly, arcane cultural norms along with

20

See MARC GALANTER AND THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRMS (1991). Note HEINZ ET. AL also discuss this work and
note that there were challenges made to the Galanter-Palay thesis, see supra note 19 at 12 (citing Robert L.
Nelson, Of Tournaments and Transformations: Explaining the Growth of Large Law Firms, WISC. L. REV.
733 (1992); Kevin A. Kordana, Law Firms and Associate Careers: Tournament Theory Versus ProductionImperative Model, 104 YALE L. J. 1907 (1995)); and see Wald, supra note 13 at 612-20.
21
See Marc Galanter and William D. Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: The Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867 (2008)
22
Id. For another study that has examined the issue of how law firm practice setting and structure
affects similar types of issues, see Stuart Scheingold and Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering:
Practice Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L. J. OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 209
(1998).
23
Again, for a detailed account of this development, see Wald, supra note 13 at 612-20. For a study
of norms, culture, and partnerships see EMMANUEL LAZEGA, THE COLLEGIAL PHENOMENON: THE
SOCIAL MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION IN A CORPORATE LAW PARTNERSHIP (2001) (also
discussed in HEINZ ET AL, supra note 19 at 13); and see, Marc Galanter and Simon Roberts, From Kinship
to Magic Circle: The London Commercial Law Firm in the Twentieth Century, 15 INT’L J. OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION143 (2008).
24
See e.g., Timothy O’Brien, Why Do So Few Women Reach the Top of Big Law Firms, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/19/business/yourmoney/19law.html; Fiona M.
Kay and John Hagan, Raising the Bar: The Gender Stratification of Law Firm Capital, 63 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 728 (1998) (discussing how such barriers exist beyond U.S. firms and into Canadian
firms too); Fiona M. Kay, Flight From Law: A Competing Risks Model of Departures from Law Firms, 31 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 301 (1997); Jo Dixon and Carol Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession: Sex, Sector,
and Salary, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 381 (1995); Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinant of Law
Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669 (1997). For important earlier studies, also see John Hagan, The
Gender Stratification of Income Inequality Among Lawyers, 68 SOCIAL FORCES 835 (1989); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers,
in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: VOL. 3 COMPARATIVE THEORIES (eds., Richard Abel and Philip Lewis,
1989); CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, ACCESS TO POWER – CROSS NATIONAL STUDIES OF
WOMEN AND ELITES (1981). Note most of these pieces are also discussed in HEINZ ET. AL, supra note
19 at 12-13. Also see Wald, supra note 13 at 611-616. In addition, in 2006 (later updated in 2008) Keith
Buckley, Associate Librarian and Lecturer in Law at Indiana University compiled a “Bibliography on Law
Firms and Gender.” For a wealth of informational readings, see
http://firms.law.indiana.edu/research/Gender.pdf.
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hidden and overt biases were cited as barriers for why lawyers of color found it
difficult to rise to the upper echelons within big law firms.25
On the comparative front, while there has not been as much written
relative to what is found on North American firms, there are still structural
observations worth mentioning. John Flood, for example, has been at the
forefront of documenting how the increase in international business transactions
has affected the organizational structure of law firm practice in Britain and
beyond.26 On China, there has been research on how Western law firms have
been entering the Chinese market, learning from local counsel, and providing
best-practices skills to their domestic counterparts – all as a process of the
“boundary-blurring”27 of legal services. In India, previous work has shown that
the present fight over whether foreign lawyers should be permitted access to the
domestic market has resulted in both Western and Indian firms restructuring how
they operate in order to meet the demands of globalization.28 And some years
back a group of scholars joined together to discuss various aspects of legal culture
and globalization in Latin America and “Latin Europe,” with bits and pieces
relating to the legal profession and the types of work influential lawyers are doing
in these regions.29
All of this literature clearly has enhanced the understanding of the
institutional and cultural structures of law practice. But it is by no means without
its gaps. As Eli Wald has argued, even with the diverse array of studies that exist,

25

David Wilkins’ work is perhaps the most prominent scholarship in this area. For a sample of his
writings on this topic, see David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in
Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Doing
Well by Doing Good? The Role of Public Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1 (1998); David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking,
Seeding, and Information Control in the International Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV.
1582 (1998) (also discussed in HEINZ ET AL, supra note 19 at 14; and there was a response to this piece by
Marc Galanter and Thomas M. Palay, A Little Jousting about the Big Law Firm Tournament, 84 VA. L. REV.
1683 (1998)); David B. Wilkins and G. Mitu Gulai, Why Are So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996). And like in supra note 24, Keith Buckley
has compiled a detailed “Bibliography on Race and the Legal Profession.” For another set of valuable
readings, see http://firms.law.indiana.edu/research/Race.pdf.
26
See e.g., John Flood, Globalization and Large Law Firms, in THE NEW OXFORD COMPANION
TO LAW (eds., Peter Cane and Joanne Conaghan, forthcoming); John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The
Role of Elite Law Firms in International Business Transactions, 10 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUDIES 35 (2007); John Flood, Resurgent Professionalism? Partnership and Professionalism in Global
Law Firms, in REDIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF EXPERT LABOUR (eds., Daniel Muzio, Stephen
Ackroyd, and Jean-Francois Chanlat, 2007); John Flood and Fabian P. Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms, and the
Stabilization of Transnational Business, 28 N.W. J. INT’L. L. & BUS. 489 (2008). Also for work that has
discussed the more general role of lawyers in society and the legal profession in other parts of Europe and in
Japan, see HERBERT JACOB, HERBERT M. KRITZER, DORIS MARIE PROVINE, AND JOSEPH
SANDERS, COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1996).
27
See Sida Liu, Globalization as Boundary-Blurring: International and Local Law Firms in China,
42 L. & SOC’Y. REV 778 (2008).
28
See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms, (GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS, forthcoming 2009)
29
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN AND ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, LEGAL CULTURE IN
THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA AND LATIN EUROPE (2003). By Latin Europe,
the volume is referring to Italy and Spain.
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there is in some sense a “standard story” 30 that has emerged regarding the
structure and growth of law firms, which has had the unfortunate effect of
narrowing the discourse. Yet in turn it also provides a nice opportunity to
consider this subject from a different perspective. To that end, a survey of the
relevant legal professions’ scholarship reveals that notwithstanding a few
studies,31 to-date there has been little critical academic examination of the extent
to which law firms are engaging in the specific practice of forming international
joint law ventures.
And this lack of literature is somewhat conspicuous, given the reports
(cited in the Introduction) that law firms from the West are entering into these
relationships – and that academics from other disciplines have looked at the joint
venture model, in other business contexts, for some years. In 2009, Sameer
Vaidya published an article reviewing the scholarship on joint ventures.32
Working off of the definition by Oded Shenkar and Yoram Zeira on joint
ventures,33 Vaidya notes that the research has been divided into several discrete
areas.34 Some studies have looked at the motivations behind the formation of
joint ventures.35 Others have focused on the structure of management (such as
how leaders are selected and who wields control).36 Still other works have
30

See Wald, supra note 13 at 612-20 (analyzing how this standard story does not explain the set of
firms in Colorado that he studied, which has achieved great profitability and elite status through the practice
of nepotism.)
31
See e.g, supra note 8. Also, as stated in supra note 8, David Wilkins has discussed law firm joint
ventures in his work, but from a different perspective. See e.g., see David B. Wilkins, “If You Can’t Join
‘Em, Beat ‘Em!” The Rise of the Black Corporate Law Firm,” 60 STAN. L. REV. 1733 (2008) (tracing how
in certain situations majority white firms in the United States, on the behest of minority politicians, made “it
clear that the only way the firm would be able to win city business was to find a suitable minority joint
venture partner . . . that would be cut in on some of this work.” (Id at 1764). See also Wilkins, Team of
Rivals? supra note 8. And there been reference to joint ventures between law schools and law firms, see
Chad P. Brown and Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing Country
Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861, 879 at footnote 31 (2005).
32
Sameer Vaidya, International Joint Ventures: An Integrated Framework, 19 INT’L. BUS. J. 8
(2009).
33
Namely that it is a “separate legal organizational entity representing the partial holdings of two or
more parent firms in which the headquarters of at least one is located outside the country of operation of the
joint venture. This entity is subject to the joint control of its parent firms each of which is economically and
legally independent of the other.” Oded Shenkar and Yoram Zeira, Human Resources Management in
International Joint Ventures: Directions for Research, 12 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 546
(1987), as found at Vaidya supra note 32 at 9. As we will see below, and as intimated in the hypothetical on
pages 3-4 above, this definition captures the JLV model that I am talking about in Singapore.
34
See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 9.
35
See id at 9-10 (citing studies like those of KATHRYN HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR JOINT
VENTURES (1985) and Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 9
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 319 (1988).
36

See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 9-14, (citing, for example, studies like John B. Cullen, Jane L.
Johnson, and Tomoaki Sakano, Japanese and Local Partner commitment to IJVs: Psychological
Consequences of Outcome and Investment in IJV Relationship, 26 J. INT’L. BUS. STUDIES 91 (1995); Paul
W. Beamish, Joint Ventures in LDCs: Partner Selection and Performance, 2 MANAGEMENT INT’L. REV.
60 (1994); Shenkar and Zeira, supra note 33; Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, Joint Ventures in the Face of
Global Competition, SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 17 (Spring 1989); Michael J. Geringer, Strategic
Determinants of Partner Selection Criteria in International Joint Ventures, 22 J. INT’L. BUS. STUDIES 41
(1991). For many more studies listed, see Vaidya, supra note 32 at 10-11 and at 13.
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concentrated on issues of trust between those involved in the joint venture.37 And
there has been scholarship on who holds better bargaining strength, access to
resources, and best practice procedures in joint venture dealings.38
According to Vaidya, with joint venture collaborators often having
different motives for entering into the relationship – along with the fact that
frequently there is a non-integrated management structure, stark salary
differentials, a lack of trust, and disparate levels of power between the foreign and
domestic partners – it is of little surprise that the literature shows that such entities
“have had a high rate of failure, [with] . . . many of them break[ing] up.”39 At the
same time, however, even in this current economic climate, Vaidya and others
hasten to state that there is little doubt that the vehicle of joint ventures is here to
stay.40 The question is whether international JLVs – for which there is a lack of
any sustained data – suffer from similar infirmities found with other joint
ventures. This inquiry is addressed in a moment; but first there will be an
examination of an environment in which several JLVs have taken place –
Singapore.

II.
A.

Background on the Singaporean Context
Political Stability and Economic Success

As stated above, on a per capita basis Singapore enjoys one of the highest
standards of living in the world.41 How it arrived at such an economic pinnacle is
37
See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 11-12 (citing, for example, studies like Robert M. Morgan and Shelby
D. Hunt, The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing, 58 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 20
(1994); Anoop Madhok, Revisiting Multinational Firms’ Tolerance for Joint Ventures: A Trust-Based
Approach, 26 J. INT’L. BUS. STUDIES 117 (1995); Cullen, Johnson, and Sakano, supra note 36; Ann V.
Llaneza, and Esteban Garcia-Canal, Distinctive Features of Domestic and International
Joint Ventures, 38 Management International Review 49 (1998)). For many more studies cited, see Vaidya,
supra note 32 at 11-12.
38
See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 12 (citing, for example, Andrew C. Inkpen and Paul W. Beamish,
Knowledge, Bargaining Power, and the Instability of International Joint Ventures, 22 ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT REVIEW 177 (1997); A. Yan and B. Gray, Bargaining Power, Management Control, and
Performance in the United States-China Joint Ventures: A Comparative Case Study, 37 ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 1478 (1994); Wesley M. Cohen and Daniel A. Levinthal, Fortune Favors the
Prepared Firm, 40 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 227 (1994)). For more studies cited, see Vaidya, supra note
32 at 11-12.
39
See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 10. Also for another study that discusses the “pitfalls” and the lessons
of doing joint ventures, see Suet-Fern Lee and Mark Tan, Joint Ventures in China – Lessons to be Learned
from Danone Versus Wahaha, 30 THE COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS (2008) (discussing a specific case in China between a French company and Chinese company
that engaged in a food joint venture.)
40

See Vaidya, supra note 32 at 14; also for further reading, see AIMIN YAN AND YADONG LUO,
INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (2001) (in particular, pages 247-248,
which provide also a nice summary of the literature to that point. The authors of this book look specifically
to joint venture structures and “argue that an understanding of the key driving and restraining forces for [why
there is] joint venture restructuring is pivotal.” Id at 247.
41
See supra note 9 for data and figures.
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beyond the scope of this study, but its achievements have been discussed at length
elsewhere.42 There are, however, certain basic points worth noting before
proceeding to an examination of the country’s legal profession and a discussion of
joint ventures. For example, Singapore has long had a strong English-language
influence, mainly from the fact that as early as 1819 it was settled by the British
East India Company led then by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles.43 By 1867
Singapore formally became a colony of Britain, and notwithstanding a four-year
period during World War II when the Japanese controlled the island, British rule
lasted until the 1950s.44 For a brief time thereafter beginning in 1963, Singapore
merged with Malaysia, but by 1965 it withdrew and became an independent state
with Lee Kuan Yew presiding as prime minister.45
There has been no more pivotal a political figure in Singapore’s post-1965
era than Lee Kuan Yew. His People’s Action Party (PAP) has held overwhelming
majorities in every session of Parliament, including prevailing once again in the
most recent election in 2006.46 As Lee himself has written, the key platform of
the PAP has been to provide Singaporeans with security and economic prosperity
– the latter being accomplished by: making the country’s infrastructure among
the best in the world, creating value-added goods for export, and opening its
borders to foreign investment.47 And although there have been various financial
42

See e.g., HENRI GHESQUIERE, SINGAPORE’S SUCCESS: ENGINEERING ECONOMIC
GROWTH (2007); TILAK ABEYSINGHE AND KEEN MENG CHOY, THE SINGAPORE ECONOMY:
AN ECONOMETRIC PERSPECTIVE (2007); HAFIZ MIZRA, MULTINATIONALS AND THE
GROWTH OF THE SINGAPORE ECONOMY (1986); R.P. LEBLAC, SINGAPORE: THE SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF A CITY STATE: 1960-1980 (2008); SUDHA V. MENON,
SINGAPORE ECONOMY: AN OVERVIEW (2008).
43
For an oft-cited biography on Raffles and work in Singapore (and beyond), see MAURICE
COLLINS, RAFFLES – THE DEFINITIVE BIOGRAPHY (1966).
44
For a classic treatment of this subject, see C.D. COWAN, NINETEENTH-CENTURY MALAYA:
THE ORIGINS OF BRITISH POLITICAL CONTROL (1961). Also, for a political economy and historical
examination of this topic, see HIROSHI SHIMIZU AND HITOSHI HIRAKAWA, JAPAN AND
SINGAPORE IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: 1870-1965.
45
Initially there was limited self-rule allowed by the British in the early 1950s. But by 1959
Singapore achieved full self-rule that saw the People’s Action Party (PAP) emerge victorious in elections for
the national legislative assembly. Note, in that 1959 election in which the PAP won, Lee Kuan Yew was
elected prime minister during that session as well. The political scientist, Diane Mauzy, has written
extensively on Singapore, the PAP, and Lee Kuan Yew. For some of her important work on these subjects,
see Diane Mauzy, Electoral Innovation and One Party Dominance in Singapore, in HOW ASIA VOTES
(eds., John Hsieh and David Newman, 2001); DIANE MAUZY AND ROBERT MILNE, SINGAPORE
POLITICS UNDER THE PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY (2002).
46
See Mauzy, supra note 45; MAUZY AND MILNE, supra note 45 at 38-50. For a more recent
account of the PAP’s dominance, see LEBLAC, supra note 42; MENON, supra note 42; also the news
magazine THE ECONOMIST keeps data and records of the country along the lines of political and socioeconomic growth. On this point regarding the PAP, see Political Forces, THE ECONOMIST, May 21, 2007,
http://www.economist.com/countries/singapore/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Political%20Forces.
47
See LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST: THE SINGAPORE STORY 19652000 (2000). In addition, Singapore played a critical role in promoting regional prosperity, development and
security. For example, in 1967, Lee led the efforts to form the Association of Southeast Asian States
(ASEAN), which had (and continues to have) as its main focus economic, political, and military security
within the region. See MAUZY AND MILNE, supra note 45 at 176-83; and see more generally, ROBERT
S. MILNE AND DIANE MAUZY, SINGAPORE: THE LEGACY OF LEE KUAN YEW (1990); and Hong
Lysa, The Lee Kuan Yew Story as Singapore’s History, 33 J. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 545 (2002).
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hurdles along the way – the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2002-2003 outbreak
of the SARS disease, and the current worldwide credit crunch and economic
downturn – Singapore has remained better-off, economically, than most other
countries around the world.48
Lee Kuan Yew’s tenure as prime minister ended with his retirement in
1990, but he remains active in government to this day, even continuing to hold a
senior ministerial position as his son, Lee Hsien Loong, serves as Singapore’s
present prime minister.49 Politically, the issue of what type of system Singapore
is has been of debate among various observers for decades.50 Several human
rights groups, academics, and political commentators, for example, routinely
castigate the government for its historically strict regulations over free speech and
political opposition and for its harsh criminal statutes and treatment of defendants
in criminal justice matters.51 The state and its backers bristle at such criticism.
They note that the country has regular parliamentary elections and strong public
and electoral support for the PAP; moreover, given the almost unrivaled standard
of living for those who live within its borders, they scoff at those who seek to
critique the ‘Singaporean’ way of governance.52
Despite the different positions of those who debate this issue, in terms of
this project, one point around which there appears consensus is that Singapore has
been the model for how to attract foreign investment. One reason cited for why
overseas business finds the country so amenable is because “the legal system [for

48

Again, for data on Singapore economic and financial health, see supra note 9. Also see, DEREK
DA CUNHA, SINGAPORE IN THE NEW MILLENIUM: CHALLENGES FACING THE CITY-STATE
(2002); Country Briefings, Singapore - Economic Data, THE ECONOMIST, May 6th, 2009,
http://www.economist.com/countries/Singapore/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DEconomic%20Data; and see
2009 Index on Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATIONA AND WALL STREET JOURNAL,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Singapore.
49
For a detailed bio on this and Lee Hsien Loong, see the government of Singapore’s website at
http://www.cabinet.gov.sg/CabinetAppointments/Mr+Lee+Hsien+Loong.htm. Also see YEW, supra note
47; MAUZY AND MILNE, supra note 45 at xii, 117.
50
For an overview of this debate, see Garry Rodan, “Singapore Exceptionalism?” Authoritarian Rule
and State Transformation, in POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEMS:
LEARNING TO LOSE 231- 251 (eds., Edward Friedman and Joseph Wong, 2008).
51
For a critical evaluation of the human rights situation in Singapore, see Amnesty International’s
website section that discusses this point in detail, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/singapore. Also Human
Rights Watch has a similar type of site devoted to reports, news articles, and analyses on this subject, at
http://www.hrw.org/asia/singapore. Also see id; and see 2008 Human Rights Report: Singapore, U.S.
Department of State, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eap/119056.htm; and Freedom House’s
evaluation of Singapore, at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2005&country=6829.
52
The Singapore government’s website addresses these points in detail. See www.gov.sg. But there
have also been others who have made these observations. See e.g., Bryan Caplan, Democracy in Singapore:
How is One-Party Rule Possible? Library of Economics and Liberty, Nov. 28, 2008,
http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2008/11/democracy_in_si.html#. See YEW, supra note 47. In his
account of Singapore being indeed an authoritative system, Gorden Silverstein has summarized this pro Lee
Kuan Yew perspective at: Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE
BY LAW: THE POLITCS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITATIVE REGIMES 73 (eds., Tom Ginsburg and
Tamir Moustafa 2008).
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financial entrepreneurs] is efficient and highly protective of private property.”53
Below, there is an examination of the context under which law and lawyers
operate within this system.

B.

The Singaporean Legal Profession and the Inviting Environment for Joint
Law Ventures

According to recent 2009 data from the Law Society of Singapore, which
is the country’s statutorily established body in charge of representing the interests
of lawyers, there are approximately 3,700 licensed practitioners in the country.54
Furthermore, while there are 781 registered law firms in Singapore, 685 are small
practices that have “1 to 5 lawyers.”55 Throughout the course of my interviews
with both Singaporean and foreign lawyers involved in joint ventures, I repeatedly
was told that while there is no formal breakdown, the conventional wisdom is that
over half of these lawyers practice mainly transactional law.
Given the heavy influence of British colonial rule, the Singaporean legal
profession continues to retain the nomenclature of ‘solicitor’ and courtroom
‘advocate’ (with the term barrister sometimes interchangeably being used for the
latter). Yet it is important to note that the Singaporean bar is unified, whereby
one who is granted a license to practice within the country may do so in court or
in transactional settings.56 In order to become a practicing lawyer one typically
graduates with an undergraduate degree in law from the National Singapore
University, the main legal educational institution in the country.57 Thereafter, the
law degree holder will engage in a period known as a “pupilage,” where she will
spend six months working under an experienced private or public sector
practitioner.58 Because the Singaporean bar recognizes law degrees granted from
several British, Australian, New Zealand, and Malaysian law schools, these
particular law degree holders, depending upon the circumstances, may be exempt
from undertaking a pupilage.59
53
See 2009 Index on Economic Freedom, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION AND WALL STREET
JOURNAL, http://www.heritage.org/index/country/Singapore.
54
See The Law Society of Singapore, Annual Report 2009,
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/about/annual_report/2009/src/Lawsoc_Annual_Report_2009.pdf.
55
Id at 36. Also see, and see Tzi Yong Sam Sim, A Guide to the Singapore Legal System and Legal
Research, GLOBA LEX, Feb. 2007, http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Singapore.htm.
56
Id at both cites.
57
Id at both cites. Recently, there has been the arrival of Singapore Management University (in
2007), which “offer[s] a 4 year law or 5 year joint-degree courses.” See Tzi Yong Sam Sim, supra note 55.
58
See The Law Society of Singapore, Pupilage, C.2
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/ble/c2_pupillage.htm.
59
See id at provision #5; also see, The Law Society of Singapore, Section F, at
http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/ble/f_aas15.htm. And for an overview of this subject, see Alexander F.H.
Loke, The Past, Present, and Future of Legal Education in Singapore, in THE SINGAPORE LEGAL
SYSTEM 325 (ed., Kevin Y.L. Tan, 1999), at
http://books.google.com/books?id=RqTwXSKrBQMC&pg=PA325&lpg=PA325&dq=legal+education+singa
pore&source=bl&ots=ye3u-
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As the vast majority of private lawyers in Singapore are in small law
practices, most of these have emerged in the post-1965 independence era. There
are those, however, that have longer histories – with a handful tending to be the
firms that are larger, more prestigious and profitable, and having experimented
with the JLV model. For example, upon my request, the Attorney General of
Singapore had his staff provide me the complete history and list of JLVs in the
country. Table 1 highlights the information.

Q8W3j&sig=cGJfLPbdyifzuldEt1ZgP2jV0XQ&hl=en&ei=yJVgSpnzI8KktgedtfDHDA&sa=X&oi=book_re
sult&ct=result&resnum=8.
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Table 160
Foreign Law Firm

Singapore Law Firm

JLV Status

Freshfields (U.K.)

Drew & Napier

2000-2007 (Disbanded)

Clifford Chance (U.K.)

Wong Partnership

2003-2009 (Disbanded)

Orrick (U.S.)

Helen Yeo/Rodyk & Davidson

2000-2003 (Disbanded)61

Allen & Overy (U.K.)

Shook Lin & Bok

2000-2009 (Disbanded)

Shearman & Sterling (U.S.)

Stamford Partnership

2001-2002 (Disbanded)

White & Case (U.S.)

Colin Ng & Partners

2001-2002 (Disbanded)

Linklaters (U.K)

Allen & Gledhill

2001-Present

Lovells (U.K.)

Lee and Lee

2001-Present

Baker & McKenzie (U.S.)

Wong & Leow Partnership

2001-Present

Allens Arthur Robinson (Australia) TSMP Law Corporation

2007-Present

Dacheng (China)

2009-Present

Central Chambers

Of the Singaporean firms in Table 1 that have participated in JLVs, four –
Drew & Napier, Rodyk & Davidson, Shook Lin & Bok, and Allen & Gledhill –
trace their roots back nearly a century or more.62 Lee & Lee has existed since the
1950s, as has another firm not listed in Table 1, Rajah & Tann, which had a more
informal alliance, rather than an official joint venture, with the Wall Street firm
Weil Gotshal & Manges.63 And another, Colin Ng, is now over two decades
old.64 (The other Singaporean firms in Table 1 have emerged within the past
60

Information provided by the Singapore Office of the Attorney General to author, June 22, 2009.
Note the dates in Table 1 were also compiled from different sources including from different lawyers in the
respective firms themselves. Also, certain foreign law firm names were shortened in order to fit inside the
above table. These include Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer and Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe.
61
Note Orrick originally entered into a joint venture with the Singaporean firm Helen Yeo, but then
Helen Yeo was merged with the Singaporean firm Rodyk & Davidson.
62
For a history of each of these firms, information can be found at the respective websites: See e.g.,
Drew & Napier, Our History, http://www.drewnapier.com/history-body.htm; Rodyk & Davidson, History,
http://www.rodyk.com/page/About/1; Shook Lin & Bok, The Firm, http://www.shooklin.com/firm.htm;
Allen and Gledhill, About Us, http://www.allenandgledhill.com/aboutus.html.
63
See Rajah & Tann, History, http://www.rajahtann.com/RajahTannCMS/misc.aspx?mid=1&aid=5.
For information on the alliance with Weil Gotshal & Manges, see Weil Gotshal Ramps Up Modest Asia
Strategy, ALB LEGAL NEWS, July 22nd, 2004, http://asia.legalbusinessonline.com/law-firms/weil-gotshalramps-up-modest-asia-strategy/1188/21021. See Lee & Lee, Brief History,
http://www.leenlee.com.sg/en/about-us/brief-history.html.
64
See Colin Ng, Our History, http://www.cnplaw.com/en/index.asp.
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fifteen years.65) One additional point to remember is that while the first JLVs
came about in 2000 foreign firms were present within the country for decades
before – although their practices were limited to non-Singaporean law.66
As one foreign lawyer told me, however, “the big elephant in the room is
how lawyers, who are trained in the [Western] rule-of-law tradition, function in
this environment.”67 On the one hand, according to this individual and several
others with whom I met, given Singapore’s long-standing commitment to open
markets, foreign capital, and multinational investment, lawyers working in these
areas have been allowed to go about their business with little interference by the
government.68 (The establishment of the JLV was in part an attempt by the
government to promote greater international legal transactions whereby Singapore
would be viewed by lucrative clients as the hub where such legal work could be
done.)
On the other hand, as Gordon Silverstein has suggested, while there may
be continued “international investor confidence”69 and an argument that
Singapore has a “judicial system that is efficient, effective, consistent, and
reliable,”70 there are constraints imposed by the state that are pervasive and which
are simply irreconcilable with how many Westerners view freedom and
democracy.71 Silverstein discusses how the state has restricted judicial review
and used the courts to clamp down on political opposition and criticism of public
policy decisions.72 But because these actions are justified as necessary for
keeping international capital flowing into the country and preserving order and
prosperity for Singaporean citizens, Silverstein explains that the state is generally
able to retain its control over, and acceptance by, local and foreign players.73
This last point is especially worth noting. Lawyers engaged in
sophisticated transactions and relationships, like JLVs, are among those that
acquiesce to the Singaporean system – staying fully aware of what is tolerated and
what is not. For them, so long as foreign investment remains privileged and they
are able to continue benefitting, financially, their “confidence,” to use
65

We will be discussing Wong & Leow, TSMP, and Central Chambers below, shortly.

66
There is some dispute as to exactly when foreign firms first came into Singapore. One report states
that this occurred beginning in 1992. (See Conrad Raj, Colin Ng’s Pact with White & Case Likely to BreakUp, SINGAPRE PRESS HOLDINGS, 2002, http://www.lawonline.com.sg/News/Law%20JV.htm. But from
the foreign firms themselves, this date is disputed. For example, Baker & McKenzie, on its site, says that
“[s]ince 1981, . . . [ it] “has had a presence in Singapore”
(http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Locations/Asia+Pacific/Offices/Singapore/default.htm). And Linklaters
notes that it has been in Singapore for two decades,
http://www.linklaters.com/Locations/Pages/Singapore.aspx.
67

Author interview, June 10, 2009 (anonymity requested by interviewee.)
Id; also author interviews with lawyers on June 9, 2009, June 11, 2009, and phone interview on
July 12, 2009 (anonymity for all requested.)
69
See Silverstein, supra note 52 at 74-75.
70
Id at 75.
71
Id at 74.
72
Id at 74-75; 86-92.
73
Id at 86-101.
68
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Silverstein’s word, will stay high. As one foreign lawyer commented to me, “we
know there are definite restrictions here – this isn’t the U.K. or the U.S. But we
find ways to work around them in order to keep making . . . [the money] we’re
making.”74
The next section will look more closely at the financial and business
interactions between foreign and local Singaporean lawyers. There will be an
evaluation how the JLV model, in particular, has fared over the past decade, with
the conclusion that the hopes for it that were present in 2000 have simply not
come to fruition.
III.
A.

An Empirical Analysis of the JLV
Background

As Table 1 above highlights, in Singapore there are five pairs of JLVs that
exist today: Linklaters (U.K) and Allen & Gledhill,
Lovells (U.K.) and Lee and Lee, Baker & McKenzie (U.S.) and Wong & Leow,
Allens Arthur Robinson (Australia) and TSMP Law Corporation, and Dacheng
(China) and Central Chambers. Before the advent of the JLV, while foreign firms
could be in Singapore and perform legal services for clients on an international
level, they were barred from providing advice or services to clients who needed
assistance on local Singaporean matters. To a certain extent this preclusion was
understandable; after all, the Singaporean bar, government, and Law Society had
an interest in ensuring that only those with accredited legal credentials be able to
practice Singaporean law.75 But at the same time this prohibition curiously
extended to properly-licensed Singaporean lawyers who were employed by
foreign firms.76
Therefore, as a means of trying to gain more complete access to the
wealthy Singaporean market foreign lawyers began talks with the government, the
Law Society, as well as with various Singaporean law firms during the late
1990s.77 Eventually the different sides arrived at an agreement that in theory
would: continue to promote the government’s goal of remaining open to foreign
74

Author interview, June 11, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
This point was explained to me during interviews conducted with Singaporeans on June 9, 2009
(anonymity requested.)
76
This complaint was mentioned during the author’s interviews with lawyers on June 9, 2009, June
11, 2009, and July 12, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
77
For background on this information, see: Report of the Committee to Develop the Singapore Legal
Sector, September 2007 at 1-2. Note we will be discussing this report in detail later in this paper. See
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF200173A1F.nsf/LookupMediaByKey/GOVI79LDSM/$file/Justice%20V%20K%20Rajah%20report.pdf. Also see, Government Accepts Key
Recommendations of Justice V.K. Rajah’s Committee on the Comprehensive Review of the Legal Services
Sector (December 7, 2007),
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI79LDRE?OpenDocument.
75
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investment; protect the interests of Singaporean law firms; and allow foreign law
firms a greater possibility of developing domestic client relationships.78 What
emerged was the JLV model, where the idea was that a new separate legal entity
would be created comprised of lawyers and staff from one foreign law firm who
would work in conjunction with lawyers and staff from one domestic law firm.79
In terms of the benefits for the foreign law firm that participated in the
JLV, on paper they were quite significant. For example, while the ratio of foreign
and Singaporean partners in the JLV had to be comparable,80 the foreign firm was
under no obligation to bring onto its payroll any of the Singaporean JLV
lawyers.81 (In fact, to a certain extent the JLV simply served as an umbrella under
which the foreign and domestic firms worked. Each kept its own ‘books,’
including payroll, but as will be seen, this lack of full integration did lead to many
Singaporean JLV-lawyers feeling like second-class citizens, resentful that the pay
they received – albeit determined by their own firm’s compensation system - was
much less than their foreign counterparts.) In addition, by being part of the JLV,
the foreign firm now could practice “banking law, finance law, corporate law, and
any other area of legal or regional work as may be approved by the AttorneyGeneral.”82 And perhaps most importantly, the JLV effectively gave the foreign
firm access to the domestic market, since now the JLV would have a licensed
Singaporean firm in it that could solicit and offer services to those highly-sought
after Singaporean clients.83
Still, the interests of the Singaporean firms were accounted for as well.
First, once a foreign firm entered into a JLV, it was barred from operating a
separate ‘foreign firm-only’ practice within the country.84 But the converse was
not true; the Singaporean firm was allowed to maintain a separate practice of its
own. Second and related, written into the government’s plan was a stipulation
that the foreign law firm in a JLV was not allowed “to share in the profits of the
constituent [i.e. partnering] Singapore law firm . . . [and that] the foreign law
78
79

Id at both cites.
For information on this point, see cites at supra note 77.

80

See Report of the Committee, Enclosure 2, supra note 77 at 3 (noting that “[I]f JLV is constituted
as a partnership, the number of equity partners in the foreign law firm and resident in Singapore shall not at
any time be greater than the number of equity partners in the Singapore law firm.
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF200173A1F.nsf/LookupMediaByKey/GOVI79M7QP/$file/Press%20release%20enclosures.pdf. It is important to keep in mind that there was no ratio
requirement in terms of the number of lawyers (associates) who were part of the JLV.
81
Id at 4 (noting explicitly that “[a] Singapore law firm lawyer in the JLV may not become an equity
or profit sharing partner in the foreign law firm. If he does so, he will be regarded as a foreign law firm
lawyer in the JLV.”)
82
Id at 2.
83
Id at 4 (noting that the “JLV may practise in areas of legal practice mutually agreed between the
constituent Singapore law firm and the foreign law firm, who may also agree among themselves the
parameters of the practice areas; and JLV shall not practise Singapore law except through a Singapore lawyer
who has in force a practising certificate and is practising in the constituent Singapore law firm of the JLV, or
a foreign lawyer registered to practise Singapore law in the JLV under section 130I of the Legal Profession
Act or in the constituent Singapore law firm of the JLV under section 130J of the same Act.”)
84
Id.
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firm’s share of the JLV’s profits”85 was restricted to only money that came from
“those areas of legal practice permitted to the JLV.”86 Third, litigating in court
and practicing real estate law – two profitable and respected sectors of the
Singaporean legal profession – were specifically kept within the exclusive domain
of locally-licensed counsel,87 thereby increasing these lawyers’ importance within
the JLV.
Fourth, as I was told by Singaporean lawyers, another incentive to joining
a JLV was the opportunity to gain exposure to the “best practices” of elite
international law firm lawyers, many of whom had been trained at the top schools
and came from legal hubs like London, New York, and Washington D.C.88 Fifth,
although they were barred from being a part of the foreign firm’s equity
partnership structure, Singaporean lawyers who were in a JLV were allowed to
play an integral role “in the foreign law firm’s regional management team.”89
This option provided Singaporean lawyers with the ability to make contacts and
develop relationships with international clients who otherwise may have been out
of reach. Finally, there was a belief that entering into a JLV with a prestigious
foreign firm would only enhance the reputation of the Singaporean firm, which
concomitantly with the above points would lead to greater profit-margins for the
latter as well.90
Therefore, there has been a list of benefits for parties to the JLV. Did the
hopes pan-out as expected – for some, yes, while for others, no. The positive
results are examined next.

B.

The Upside - And Why Relationships Matter

For most of the joint ventures that exist today, the manner in which they
formed is similar in nature. Typically, there is a foreign firm that arrives or
already has a presence in Singapore that then creates a JLV with a wellestablished, well-reputed local firm. So, for instance, Linklaters, the elite magic
circle London-based firm, which had been in Singapore for nearly twenty years,
in 2001 entered into a JLV with the highly-regarded, century-old Singaporean
firm of Allen & Gledhill.91 Similarly, Lovells, another prestigious U.K. firm that
same year formed a JLV with Lee & Lee, a relatively large full-service

85

Id at 2.
Id. So, in other words, if the JLV made money from other sources, that were not part of what the
foreign law firm could be involved in, then the foreign law firm could not claim access to that money.
87
Id.
88
This statement came during interviews with such lawyers conducted on June 9, 2009 (two separate
phone interviews conducted), June 15, 2009, and July 5, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
89
See Report of the Committee, Enclosure 2, supra note 77 at 4.
90
See interviews cited in supra note 88.
91
The Linklaters website discusses this process, see
http://www.linklaters.com/Locations/Pages/Singapore.aspx.
86
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Singaporean firm that was started in 1955 by three local lawyers, one of them
former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew.92
And although there are two other existing JLVs that have more recently
been created, these mergers have had like characteristics. In 2007, the Australian
legal powerhouse, Allens Arthur Robinson, joined forces with the “boutique
corporate and commercial”93 Singaporean firm, TSMP. While TSMP itself only
emerged in 1998, it was founded by a lawyer who was a former partner at the elite
Singaporean firm of Drew & Napier and who was also once the Dean of the Law
Faculty at the National University of Singapore.94 And in 2009, the large Chinese
law firm of Dacheng established a JLV with Central Chambers,95 a Singaporean
outfit that while only seven years old brings together lawyers from diverse
settings, some of whom have been in practice for nearly three decades.96
The only present-day JLV that stands apart, in terms of how it was
created, is the one started by Baker & McKenzie. About a decade back, Jon
Bauman published the history of this global American mega-law firm.97 And
there have been other reports documenting the growth of this mammoth
enterprise.98 Relevant for this study, though, is that Baker’s JLV in Singapore
was not a combination of it and an already existing local firm. Operating under
the Swiss Verein model, whereby its offices around the world comprise a
confederation of sorts that function in an independent manner and in accordance
with the laws of the jurisdiction under which each respective branch is residing,99
Baker launched the domestic Singaporean firm of Wong and Leow in 1996.100
Wong and Leow today has some 80 lawyers within it and is a separate legal
entity, with its own clients, profits, management structure, and partnership-track
for associates.101 It has, however, worked closely with Baker in a joint venture
since 2001 and this relationship – highlighted in legal periodicals, news reports,
92

For a brief history of Lee & Lee, see http://www.leenlee.com.sg/en/about-us/brief-history.html.
Also for a discussion of Lovells partnership with Lee & Lee, see
http://www.lovells.com/Lovells/Worldwide/Singapore/Singapore.htm.
93
For a discussion of this announcement and where this quotation can be found, see TSMP’s website
at http://www.tsmplaw.com/docsandarticles/AARTSMPJLV.pdf.
94
Id.
95
See Rashida Yosufazi, Firms Form First China-Singapore JV to Target India, ALB LEGAL
NEWS, July 24, 2009, http://asia.legalbusinessonline.com/news/breaking-news/firms-form-first-chinasingapore-jv-to-target-india/36103.
96
See Central Chambers Law Corporation Website, About Our People,
http://www.centralchambers.com.sg/CentralChambersLawCorporation456/Page/5114/OurPeople.aspx.
97
See JON BAUMAN, PIONEERING A GLOBAL VISION: THE STORY OF BAKER &
MCKENZIE (1999).
98
See e.g., Baker & McKenzie Lures 7 Energy Lawyers from T & K, LAW 360, June 12, 2009; Legal
Advice, THE ECONOMIST, August 21, 2008. Also for a host of articles on the Baker business model, see
the San Francisco Business Times, which has tracked these pieces over the course of the last several years,
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/related_content.html?topic=Baker%20%26%20McKenzie.
99
See BAUMANN, supra note 97; and see Baker & McKenzie Profile, LEGAL 500,
http://www.legal500.com/firms/50079-baker-mckenzie/offices/10313-zurich/profile.
100
For information on this set-up, see Baker’s website at:
http://www.bakernet.com/BakerNet/Locations/Asia+Pacific/Offices/Singapore/default.htm.
101
For background on Wong & Leow and its operations, see http://www.legal500.com/firms/33424wong-leow-llc/offices/31590-singapore.
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and in conversations with various lawyers in the country – seems ultimately to
define who Wong and Leow is.102
In spite of the distinct way the Baker-Wong JLV emerged, it and the other
above-mentioned JLVs remain standing, and the questions that arise are both why
and how? Perhaps most obviously, they have done so because they are profitable.
As one lawyer mentioned, “we’re making money – plain and simple. But why
we’re making money; that’s what interesting.”103 As this individual commented,
and as the data gathered from the empirical interviews suggest, there are several
common contributing factors at play here. A key reason relates to the fact that
there are strong relationships and significant professional trust that exist between
the foreign and domestic players involved.104 As another Singaporean lawyer
stated, “remember, it’s always about relationships. We succeed because we can
work with them and vice versa.”105
Not surprisingly, these ties have developed and are nurtured in different
ways depending on the JLV. For some, the relationships began with the local
firm’s Singaporean lawyers already having friends within the foreign firm wellbefore entering into the joint venture. In other instances, lawyers currently in the
respective Singaporean firm actually worked in the partnering foreign firm at
some earlier point and became familiar with the latter’s culture, norms, and ways
of doing business; in these cases the foreign firm’s lawyers naturally came to
learn of these Singaporeans – “as professionals and as people”106 – before
deciding whether to pursue the JLV route with the local firm. And of course that
“personalities have simply meshed”107 following the creation of the joint venture
has helped preserve the cohesiveness of these mergers too.
In addition to working well with, respecting, and liking one another, the
foreign and local lawyers of these JLVs also noted that their relationships are
strong because of the realistic expectations that each side has. Consider, for a
moment, two separate but related issues. First, in terms of leadership and
management, every lawyer in these partnerships with whom I spoke emphasized
that their respective joint operation currently continues because there is not, as
one respondent remarked, a “colonialist mindset”108 in how the JLV is run.
Otherwise put, there is a mutual understanding that while the foreign lawyers
have important skills to convey, they also have as much to learn from the
Singaporeans. There is a real sense among the Western and domestic lawyers that
given the history of British imperialism in the region, together with the strong
102

Beyond hearing this during my various interviews with Singaporean and foreign lawyers, the close
interaction between Baker and Wong & Leow has been discussed at id, at Baker’s website, supra note 100,
and at Legal 500’s site, http://www.legal500.com/firms/50079-baker-mckenzie/offices/30159-singapore.
103
Author phone interview with lawyer on June 30, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
104
Id. Also author phone interview with lawyers on June 15, 2009 and July 12, 2009 (anonymity
requested.)
105
Author phone interview with lawyer on June 15, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
106
This comment was made by the lawyer at id.
107
This comment was made during author’s phone interview with lawyer on July 12, 2009 (anonymity
requested.)
108
Author phone interview with lawyer on June 30, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
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values placed on Singaporean culture, identity, and independence, that
cooperation is necessary in order to administer a successful joint venture of this
type. As such, decisions on matters ranging from hiring to promotion to
marketing to soliciting client business tend to be made in a joint fashion between
the foreign and Singaporean leaders of the JLV.109
Second, and particularly relating to this last point involving clientcontacts, there appears to be a solid understanding as to how business will be
apportioned and files allocated between the JLVs’ foreign and domestic lawyers,
although once again there is variation as to how this takes place.110 Recall, none
of the joint venture foreign lawyers with whom I met shied away from stating that
their main motivation for being in Singapore was to ‘make money.’ Yet how they
have sought to do this has varied depending on the context. For some, where a
local client is satisfied with the already existing relationship she has with her
Singaporean firm – a firm that also happens to be in a JLV – I was told by these
partnering foreign firms’ lawyers that they would be loathed to attempt to rope
this business into the joint venture.111 “The client would have to pay more and
may not even need us; and we’ll end-up pissing off [our Singaporean JLV
partner],” one foreign lawyer said.112 Now, this same lawyer did say that in
situations where the JLV brought value-added services to such a client, like
helping on an international deal with which the Singaporean firm had little
experience, he then “certainly will make a play – after all that’s the whole purpose
of the JLV.”113 But such outreach is accepted and well-understood under these
circumstances, this lawyer remarked.
There can also be a different type of client-contact understanding, when
there is an implicit acknowledgment that the JLV serves as a base for the foreign
law firm to expand its business more regionally, while the Singaporean JLV
lawyers are deemed the point-persons for work within the country.114 Where each
side needs the assistance of the other, then the two will certainly come together;
but otherwise the expectation in this case, which describes the relationship of one
of the observed JLVs, is that each side has its respective jurisdictional terrain.115
And another successful arrangement can occur when the foreign and domestic
lawyers view the JLV, rather than their own respective practices, as the primary
setting where client-demands are met.116 In this situation, there is a seamlessness
in the everyday operations of the joint venture and smooth interactions between
the foreign and domestic lawyers – namely because both sides have an
109

Information gathered during phone interviews conducted on June 15, 2009, June 30, 2009, and July
12, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
110

Id.
Information gathered during phone interviews conducted on June 15, 2009 and July 12, 2009
(anonymity for both requested.)
112
Author phone interview with lawyer on July 12, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
113
Id.
114
Author phone interview with lawyer, June 15, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
115
Id.
116
Author phone interview with lawyer, June 30, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
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understanding that the JLV is the main face representing who they are within the
country.117
It is important to note that even with these understandings and trusting
relationships there are still issues of conflict that arise within the above JLVs.
Pay differentials between the foreign and domestic JLV lawyers, inadvertent (and
sometimes purposeful) slights, frustrations over practice-procedures, and the
everyday pressures of staying financially strong are just some of the tensions that
can exist. One participant even compared the JLV-model to a stressful marriage –
noting that, yes, there are good times, but there are also times when one or the
other side simply feels like walking away.118 However, as this person noted, upon
reflection and the routine ‘couple’s counseling’119 of sorts that occurs – mainly
consisting of reevaluating the positive financial returns of the merger – the
decision to remain together rather than divorcing carries the day.
With all this said, though, as Table 1 illustrates, the opposite conclusion
has been reached by a majority of JLVs in Singapore. And the question here is
why? Once again, relationships are the key, but in these cases it is the lack of
them that has accounted for the dissolution of these marriages.

C.

The Downside – And Why Relationships Matter

In looking at the data on disbanded JLVs since 2000, of the six, the three
that lasted the shortest periods of time were with American firms, White & Case
with Colin Ng and Shearman & Sterling with Stamford Partnership (each from
2001-2002) and Orrick with Helen Yeo (that then was absorbed into the
Singaporean firm of Rodyk & Davidson) from 2000-2003. The other three
involved British firms – Freshfields, Clifford Chance, and Allen & Overy – that
had joined, respectively, with the Singaporean firms of Drew & Napier, Wong
Partnership, and Shook Lin & Bok. Similar to those JLVs that continue to exist
today, these six that dissolved each started with the primary hope of reaping
increased profit margins and expanding client bases.120 Yet the troubles that
ensued placed too great a burden on these mergers, with the result being that each
ultimately disbanded.
As the interview data reveal, the main issue dividing these two groups of
lawyers was that neither side had the same set of expectations regarding the JLV.
And each side felt as though it was being taken advantage of – leading to a
117

Id.
Author interview with lawyer, July 12, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
119
This was my term that I used during my interview with the lawyer, but the lawyer at id eagerly
embraced this phrase saying it captured the exact sentiment he was trying to convey.
120
Author interview with Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview
with separate Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with a foreign
lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with a foreign lawyer, June 10, 2009
(anonymity requested).
118
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situation where there was simply too little trust for these relationships to have any
long-term sustainability. First, take the sentiments of and complaints from the
foreign lawyers with whom I spoke. One frequent refrain was that the
Singaporean firms conveniently forgot how fortunate they were to be linked to a
prestigious Western law firm.121 Two different foreign lawyers from two
different firms used the exact same language in noting how significant the
“branding benefits”122 were to the Singaporeans participating in the JLV. Each
described how in a society where prestige is of the highest import, being able to
affiliate with the most well-reputed of Western firms brought enormous
international status to these Singaporean lawyers, the likes of which they had
never seen before.123 And with this new reputational position, the Singaporean
firms gained access to various client-networks around the globe as well as the
opportunity to work with some of the most talented and experienced transactional
lawyers anywhere.124 But in the eyes of these foreign lawyers, rarely was there
any sense of gratitude or recognition from their domestic affiliates for what they
were receiving.125
Moreover, from the foreign lawyers’ vantage point, the return on their
investment in the JLV was relatively small. For one thing, the goal of making
serious inroads into the local market via their Singaporean partners never
materialized to the extent that they had hoped.126 Sure there were some cases
where it made little sense to enlist clients into the JLV who were already
represented before-hand by the Singaporean firm, especially if the expertise of the
foreign firm was not needed. The foreign lawyers stated they accepted and
understood this reality.127 But in other cases, particularly with yet-unsigned
clients, the foreign lawyers believed that their respective Singaporean JLV
partners would at times undermine the joint-relationship by seeking to divert
potential business into their (the Singaporeans) own individual firms.128 (Recall
that under the JLV rules, while foreign law firms that entered into these mergers
had to give-up their separate practices, the Singaporean firms did not.)
Then on those deals where clients did require the Singaporean and foreign
lawyers to work together, I was told by the latter that the work performed by the
domestic counterparts was frequently “sub-par.”129 One such foreign lawyer
relayed how he sometimes felt like he was educating two clients – the paying one
and his Singaporean JLV colleagues who were scrambling to stay atop of the
121

Author interview with lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with lawyer,
June 10, 2009 (anonymity requested).
122
Id at both cites.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id; also author interview with another pertinent foreign lawyer, June 11, 2009 (anonymity
requested).
127
Id at all cites.
128
Id at all cites.
129
This was the word used by lawyer interviewed on June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested), but this
sentiment was present in the other interviews conducted at id.
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deal.130 Another foreign lawyer stated that from a client-services point of view,
he often became upset at how his international clients who needed domestic work
done by the Singaporean lawyers complained of local counsel being unresponsive
or unprepared to provide the necessary information.131 Partly for these reasons,
certain foreign lawyers even remarked that the Singaporean lawyers, who were
being paid lower than their foreign colleagues but in accordance with their own
Singaporean firm’s salary structure, simply did not deserve to be compensated at
any higher of a rate.132
That the Singaporean lawyers held a different perspective on why their
JLV-arrangements failed would be a woeful understatement. Although some
variation existed in the responses from this group, a set of common themes
emerged highlighting the hurt and resentful feelings of not being appreciated in a
number of ways. For example, I was informed that it was only because of the
JLV-arrangement that some of the foreign firms were able to receive prime officespace in the heart of the city at such an affordable rate.133 This situation occurred
because many of the Singaporean firms had resided in these locations well-before
2000 and either had extra room to house their foreign colleagues or negotiated
favorable rental agreements for additional space in these office-towers on the
foreign firms’ behalf.134
Furthermore, as even some foreign lawyers conceded – and as
vociferously emphasized by the Singaporeans – had it not been for the domestic
JLV-lawyers, the firms from abroad could never have started their regional
private investment funds practices, which proved extremely rewarding during
their time in the merger. There were other issues as well. Perhaps most
significantly, the Singaporeans interviewed uniformly noted that the lack of
economic integration,135 particularly as it related to compensation within the JLV,
served as a point of contention that simply could not be overcome.136 While
understanding that salaries within the JLV were determined by the respective firm
130

Author interview with lawyer, June 11, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
Author interview with lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
132
Author interview with lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with lawyer,
June 10, 2009 (anonymity requested); Author interview with lawyer, June 11, 2009 (anonymity requested).
The foreign law firms in Singapore generally use the standard ‘lockstep formula’ in allocating salaries. By
practice, law firms following a lockstep method compensate their employees on the basis of years of service;
so in theory a third-year associate in the London home office would earn the same as a third-year associate in
New York satellite branch. For a discussion of this point, see James D. Cotterman, Lockstep Compensation.
Does it Still Merit Consideration? LAW PRACTICE TODAY, Aug. 2007,
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/fin08071.shtml.
133
Author interview with Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview
with second, separate Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with third
Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested).
134
Id.
135
Author interview with foreign lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with
Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with second, separate
Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with third Singaporean lawyer,
June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested).
136
Id.
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(i.e. the foreign firm paid its own lawyers while the domestic firm did the same),
the Singaporeans nevertheless expressed frustration that no agreement was ever
reached equalizing the pay-scale. As one Singaporean lawyer commented, “we
were working the same horrible hours, on the same tedious projects, and making
so much less!”137
Many of the Singaporeans also disputed the claim that the foreign side
willingly mentored and transmitted best practice techniques to them. It was quite
the opposite according to the domestic lawyers, especially when it came to
sharing standard form documents, or ‘precedent’ materials, as they referred to
them.138 As I was told by the Singaporeans, and again later confirmed by the
foreign counterparts, the latter would zealously guard these papers, perplexing
and infuriating the former.139 From the foreign lawyers’ viewpoint, these were
extremely sensitive work-products, and given that the Singaporeans had their own
separate firms and separate clients, it would be irresponsible not to monitor
closely these files.140 For the local lawyers, such rationale was mind-boggling.
As one Singaporean exclaimed, “We were supposed to be partners! It’s true, I
needed to learn a lot, and I wanted to. But instead, we kept having to reinvent the
wheel!”141 This person went-on to note that the lack of cooperation by the foreign
firm cost valuable time, but as importantly, it contributed to a shattering of trust
that severely undermined the joint-relationship almost from the start.142
This absence of trust had domino-like implications. For example, the
Singaporean side in several of these JLVs admitted retaining tight control over
previously-acquired local clients within their own individual firms, refusing even
to explore the possibility that the JLV might be involved. The Singaporeans
emphatically justified their actions on the grounds that client-preferences for such
sole representation always governed, that the JLV-rates for these particular clients
were too costly and unnecessary, and that, yes, if the foreign firms could ‘turfguard’, then so could the Singaporeans as well. 143
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Author interview with Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested.) This particular
lawyer stated that the Singaporean salaries were often one-third less than foreign salaries.
138
Author interview with Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview
with second, separate Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with third
Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested).
139
Author interview with Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview
with second, separate Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with third
Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with two different foreign
lawyers, one on June 9, 2009 and the other on June 10, 2009.
140
Author interview with two different foreign lawyers, one on June 9, 2009 and the other on June 10,
2009 (anonymity requested.)
141
Author interview with a Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
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Id.
143
Stoking the ire of the foreign side further was that their Singaporean partners in some instances had
clients in other parts of Asia, but because there was no JLV-relationship in these settings, the Singaporeans
were even that much more protective of their client-relationships. Author interview with Singaporean
lawyer, June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with second, separate Singaporean lawyer,
June 9, 2009 (anonymity requested). Author interview with third Singaporean lawyer, June 9, 2009
(anonymity requested).
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With unhappiness at a peak between these different JLV-partners, several
of the foreign firms began looking outside of their unstable arrangements to other
local Singaporean lawyers with whom they could engage.144 (Although, they did
maintain their formal JLV-ties with their original, respective Singaporean partners
and continued to work with them as needed.) In addition, as the tensions
mounted, a provocative refrain gained momentum among the agitated
Singaporeans – namely, that the foreign lawyers were acting similarly to how the
colonial rulers of years past behaved. Charges that the foreign firms were
exploiting the inexpensive Singaporean legal labor market for self-serving
purposes, and that the personal treatment by these Westerners towards the
domestic practitioners was shoddy and condescending, ran rampant among the
disaffected.145 While the foreign lawyers dismissed these accusations as baseless
and as a convenient excuse for the Singaporeans’ own failure to keep pace with
the complex needs of internationally sophisticated clients, the colonialist label had
traction and together with the other above-mentioned events, prompted interested
observers to start seriously reevaluating this entire business-model arrangement.
Witnessing this discontent and feeling pressure from both the foreign and
domestic law firms, in August of 2006 the government decided that something
needed to be done. It called on the eminent lawyer and a sitting justice of the
Singaporean Court of Appeal, V.K. Rajah, to conduct a thorough assessment of
the JLV.146 The Justice brought together an array of interested parties, under what
came to be called the ‘Rajah Committee,’ to study the history, pluses, and
shortcomings that had accompanied this law firm merger experiment.147 In
December 2007, after surveying the diversity of opinions, the Committee issued
its final report on the JLV, which ultimately caused an important policy shift on
the part of the government. These findings are examined next.

IV.
A.

The Rajah Committee Report – And Where To Go From Here
Enhancing the JLV

It is important to keep in mind that while the Rajah Committee reevaluated
the functioning of the JLV, neither it, nor the Singaporean government, ever
sought to scale back the country’s general policy of intense economic
144

I was told this by different foreign lawyers engaged in this practice, during, for example, interviews
conducted on June 9, 2009, June 10, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
145
For example, one Singaporean lawyer, during my interview on June 9, 2009, referred to the foreign
law firm lawyers as “colonial bastards.” Another, that same day, discussed how culturally insensitive foreign
lawyers were.
146
For background on the government’s decision to call-on Justice Rajah to conduct a formal inquiry
of the JLV-situation, see the Singapore Ministry of Law Website, Government Accepts Key
Recommendations of Justice V.K. Rajah’s Committee on the Comprehensive Review of the Legal Services
Sector, http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI79LDRE?OpenDocument.
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liberalization in the legal services sector.148 Perhaps for that reason, the JLV
model, which in principle continued to resonate among various government
leaders, remained one to which both the Committee and the state stayed wedded;
thus, those who hoped that Justice Rajah’s reforms would serve as a formal
rebuke of the JLV structure were disappointed.
To start, the Committee did not even move away from the language of the
“joint law venture” in its reforms, issuing a statement saying while there had been
difficulties with the original JLV program, having a new, better, “enhanced JLV”
would ameliorate many of the problems that beset the initial model.149 One way
would be by allowing foreign law firms within a JLV directly “to hire Singaporequalified lawyers to advise on Singapore law.”150 This was important because
recall that before this change, if a Singaporean-licensed lawyer joined a foreign
law firm, regardless of whether that firm was part of a JLV, the lawyer lost her
privilege to practice Singaporean law. Now, however, such revocation would not
occur if the foreign firm was part of an enhanced JLV, and in making this
amendment the Committee’s hope was that more organic, enjoyable, and
productive relationships might develop among the different lawyers within the
venture.151
The Committee also recommended expanding the JLV’s jurisdiction in
one important, lucrative area – international commercial arbitration. Prior to
2007, foreign law lawyers were restricted in what they could do, arbitration-wise.
However, the Committee argued for enhancing the scope of foreign law firms
within the JLV by allowing them to “participate wherever arbitration is
contemplated: [namely] in the vetting and drafting of Singapore law agreements
incorporating arbitration clauses, and [by] advising parties on their legal rights
and liabilities in such agreements both before and after the dispute is referred to
arbitration.”152 For the Committee, equalizing what foreign and domestic lawyers
148

In fact, from the Ministry of Law’s website, see its discussion of the Rajah Committee report,
where it takes from the document itself, noting: “Liberalisation of the Legal Services Sector. The most
significant set of proposals made by the Committee concerns the liberalisation of the legal services sector.
The Government agrees with the Committee that the legal services sector is a key pillar of the economy.
Liberalising the sector will support Singapore's aim to be a vibrant global city and an attractive venue for
talent. Liberalising the legal market will result in three key benefits. First, it will bolster the growth of our
banking, financial and other key economic sectors through a full range of competitive cutting edge legal
services. Secondly, the legal sector, itself an important component of our economy, will grow and Singapore
will establish itself as a premier regional legal centre. Thirdly, we will attract and retain high quality
international and local legal talent, which is critical to sustain the legal sector and economy in the long term.”
See http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI79LDRE?OpenDocument.
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See Ministry of Law Website, Government Accepts Key recommendations, supra note 146,
Enhanced Joint Law Venture Scheme,
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI79LDRE?OpenDocument.
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Id.
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Id. (“FLFs [foreign law firms] may hire up to one Singapore lawyer for every foreign lawyer, and
the Singapore lawyers should have more than three years' experience.”)
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Id.
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could do in arbitration would eliminate the privileged position that the latter till
now had been able to hold within the JLV. The hope again was that with greater
seamlessness would come stronger bonds of trust that would help make the JLV
run in a more cohesive manner.
To punctuate these points further, the Committee concluded by suggesting
that not only should JLV- profits be shared more generously between the two sets
of lawyers,153 but that there be increased integration in the management and
administration of the joint venture.154 Thus, for the Rajah Committee the
recommendations for addressing the problems accompanying the original JLVmodel centered around promoting greater – not lesser – access to the Singaporean
market by foreign law firms. As will be observed next, the Committee went one
step further in its stated goal of liberalizing the legal services sector by
recommending an entirely separate program in which foreign law firms could
participate.

B.

The QFLF

Along with the section on ways to enhance the JLV, the Rajah Committee
introduced the Qualified Foreign Law Firm (QFLF) license in its report as well.
This QFLF program involved allowing foreign law firms the option of foregoing
entering into a JLV and instead providing them with an opportunity to “practi[c]e
Singapore law in commercial areas through [the direct hiring of] Singaporequalified lawyers.”155 While remaining firmly committed to the notion that this
“new [initiative] would add greater diversity, competitiveness, and vibrancy to the
legal market,”156 the government did continue to prohibit foreign firms from
engaging in “criminal law, retail conveyancing, family law, administrative law
and all aspects of . . . litigation.”157 It also restricted the number of foreign law
firms who would be able to receive the QFLF license. (The original number was
set at five,158 but it later was expanded to six.159)
153

Id (noting that “[t]he foreign law firm will be allowed to share up to 49% of the profits of the
constituent Singapore law firm in the permitted areas. Apart from this, the EJLV constituents will be allowed
to decide whether, and to what extent, to share profits.”)
154
Id (noting that “[t]he partners from the Singapore law firms will be allowed to concurrently hold
partnership and administrative positions in the foreign law firms. . . . In addition, parties which are interested
in a joint venture or which are currently in a joint venture agreement, may suggest any other arrangement
beneficial to their particular circumstances. The Minister for Law and the Attorney-General will have the
discretion to approve joint venture structures that go beyond the proposed conditions set out above.”
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Id.
Id.
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Id.
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Id at section (i) (Noting “[u]p to five FLFs will be given a QFLF license to practise Singapore law
through Singapore-qualified lawyers employed by the firm.”)
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See Ministry of Law Singapore website, Award of Qualifying Foreign Law Practice (QFLP)
Licenses, December 5, 2008,
http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/minlaw/press_release/P-20081205-1.
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In order to win one of these licenses the foreign firms had to enter a
competition by submitting proposals to the government that addressed why they
were applying and the type of work they planned on doing.160 Importantly, as part
of the process, they also were required to provide “revenue projections.”161 This
meant they had to forecast – and agree – that if designated as a QFLF, 50% of
their revenue would come from outside of the Singapore market after two years,
and 80% would be from ‘offshore’ sources after five years – else their license was
subject to revocation by the government.162
In early 2009, the government named four British firms – Norton Rose,
Clifford Chance, Allen & Overy, and Herbert Simon – and two American firms –
Latham & Watkins and White & Case – as recipients of five-year QFLF licenses.
Lawyers from the firms that failed in their bids reacted with both anger and
disappointment.163 Two sentiments that were consistent among this group were:
a). the belief that the government’s assurance to them that they could reapply
within twelve to eighteen months offered little comfort, given the fact, as one
lawyer stated, “a lot of financial damage will have already been done to us [by
those with QFLF privileges] in this time.”164 And
b). a frustration that no detailed, individualized explanations were given to those
firms as to why they lost out. This same lawyer intimated that he thought it was
because his firm did not inflate its revenue projections as much as he believed the
others who were awarded the licenses had.165

160
See Ministry of Law Website, Government Accepts Key recommendations, supra note 146,
Enhanced Joint Law Venture Scheme,
http://notesapp.internet.gov.sg/__48256DF20015A167.nsf/LookupContentDocsByKey/GOVI79LDRE?OpenDocument. (Noting at section (ii), “FLFs will have to compete for the licences by
demonstrating a commitment to Singapore. They would be asked for proposals regarding the size and
constituency of their local office, the areas of work in which they will engage, and the countries which they
will service from Singapore.”) Also see id.
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This point was stated to me by a lawyer on June 10, 2009, as well as a lawyer (whose firm did not
receive a QFLF-license) on June 11, 2009 (anonymity for both requested.)
162
According to observers, the idea behind this move was simple: it was a way of pacifying the
domestic bar that worried that the QFLF-license would enable the foreign law firms to overtake completely
the local market. And the way it would be done, according to those concerned, is as follows. The foreign
firms, with all of their resources would come in and cut rates for Singaporean clients to the point where
domestic firms simply could not compete. Even though the foreign firms would absorb some initial loss,
because of their strength, size, and resources, they could withstand this pressure – at least until the domestic
firms folded. At that point, as this argument goes, the foreign firms would then jack-up their rates, essentially
creating a monopoly on such legal services within the country. This ‘percentage/off-shore QFLF provision,’
thus, served as a check on having such an outcome.
163
See Ministry of Law Singapore website, Award of Qualifying Foreign Law Practice (QFLP)
Licenses, December 5, 2008,
http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/minlaw/press_release/P-20081205-1.
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Author interview with lawyer on June 11, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
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Ultimately, because of its recent implementation, it is difficult to know at
this point the effects that the QFLF program will have on the Singaporean legal
labor market. On the one hand, that foreign law firms can now compete on their
own against their domestic counterparts does signal the government’s continued
desire to make Singapore an inviting place for international investors. On the
other hand, the government’s attention to the demands of its domestic
constituency also sends a cue to the foreign firms that the QFLF license has
limitations. As a foreign lawyer who is currently involved in one of the few ongoing JLVs stated to me, he saw no real benefit for his firm to become a QFLF.166
Especially with the new enhanced-JLV in place, he noted, why “mess with
something that is working just fine for us.”167

V.

Conclusion

As has been learned, positive sentiments towards JLVs (enhanced or
otherwise), like those felt by the previous lawyer above, are clearly not the norm,
and whether the enhanced-JLV or QFLF license will serve as a better model than
the original JLV remains to be seen. Placed in a larger context, the findings of
this pilot study offer a start on what will hopefully be further research on two
fronts: 1.) the efforts by other governments that are seeking to attract
international law firms; and 2.) the entrepreneurial initiatives that are being
undertaken by international law firms to enter into emerging, thriving, but still for
foreign lawyers, restrictive countries. Simply put, so much is unknown, which for
the curious scholar serves as ripe terrain for future study. For example, while
there are reports, like those cited in the Introduction, that document the presence
of JLVs in places like the Middle East and Japan, to what extent empirically is
this model regularly-used by foreign law firms as a means of gaining access to
other potentially profitable, untapped domestic markets? In these other settings,
what types of foreign firms use JLVs – traditional, big, elite firms, midsize ones,
and/or smaller practices? Once created, how successful have these JLVs been in
these other places? Have there been tensions, economic or cultural, like seen in
Singapore, within these other JLVs? How, if at all, have JLVs complemented,
competed with, or fared against other existing foreign/domestic law firm
relationships, such as ‘best-friend’ alliances, international referral-networks, and
the like? All of these questions arise out of this pilot project, and the preliminary
findings regarding Singapore hopefully provide a beginning point for which
subsequent scholars can refer.
Interestingly, two countries that I am in the process of examining next and
that are presently using variations of law firm joint-ventures are Indonesia and

166
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Author phone interview with lawyer on July 12, 2009 (anonymity requested.)
Id.
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Vietnam.168 Both have long looked to Singapore for how to increase foreign
investment and expand the growth in their respective economies. As one foreign
lawyer working in Singapore said, he and his firm have been eyeing the
Indonesian and Vietnamese markets for some time.169 According to this person,
leaders in both these countries are convinced that greater foreign investment –
including greater investment from foreign law firms – will significantly improve
the standards of living in these two societies.170 Working with government
policymakers in Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh City, this individual further noted that
if the two countries continue liberalizing their economic policies accordingly,
which he expects, there will be an opportunity for international firms to prosper
immensely in these places as well.171
Another country where the findings of this pilot study will be important is
in India. Elsewhere, detailed work has been done on how there is presently a
fierce debate over whether and to what extent foreign law firms should be allowed
admission into that country.172 Today the situation is that foreign law firms are
barred from entry into India, although their presence is felt in a number of
different ways.173 The evidence adduced from that India project also suggests
varied and nuanced positions on the part of multiple constituencies, including
international and domestic law firm lawyers, solo practitioners working in the
local Indian courts, government officials, judges, and grassroots activists.174
There is a sense from those who support liberalizing the legal services sector –
and even from some opponents – that if the Indian market eventually opens
formally to foreign law firms, the process will have to be gradual, with the jointventure framework pointed to as a model possibly worth adopting.175 Given the
difficulties encountered in neighboring Singapore, where the domestic opposition
has been nowhere near the strength seen in India, the findings here should be of
interest (and possibly even concern) for those who believe that the joint venture
might be the appropriate vehicle used to settle the legal services conflict within
that country.
Finally, returning to the discussion that began this study, for those
American and British law firms that are looking to enter as-of-yet untapped
168

See Directorate General of Tax, Special Regional Office Jakarta, Information for Foreign
Investment in Indonesia, http://www.kanwilpajakkhusus.depkeu.go.id/infoInvestment.asp. For Vietnam, see
GLOBAL INVESTMENT & BUSINESS CENTER, VIETNAM: BUSINESS LAW HANDBOOK 126-127
(2007), at
http://books.google.com/books?id=btswcYNEl_MC&pg=PA126&lpg=PA126&dq=vietnam+%22Foreign+la
w+firms%22&source=bl&ots=2_IT_siQUH&sig=yuC9k7OzaSWMQY0Tp69XRg5p9UE&hl=en&ei=36eBS
q_KBJDIMN2gJoL&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7#v=onepage&q=vietnam%20%22Foreign%20law%20firm
s%22&f=false.
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foreign markets as a means of offsetting the downturn in business in their own
home economies, there are useful lessons to glean from the Singapore case. Since
certain JLVs have indeed functioned adequately in Singapore it is not impossible
that future ones may do so here as well. The key determinants are how
economically well-integrated the arrangement is, whether there is sufficient
cultural sensitivity, and how willing both sides are to work in good-faith with one
another while maintaining realistic business expectations. Where these variables
are absent or lacking in salience, the evidence from above suggests that more
often than not JLVs will face daunting challenges. In sum, there needs to be the
opportunity for positive, nurturing relationships to develop and thrive, because the
bottom line is that the success or failure of these law firm joint ventures is
ultimately and directly related to how much trust exists among the different
working parties.
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